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REPLY TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant SEUALG reasserts its statement of facts as a true and correct recitation 
of the facts in this case. Appelle Workforce Appeals Board sets forth in its statement of 
facts some incorrect statements requiring correction. 
At page 5, the Board states "Buck and Kevin were verbally disciplined by their 
supervisor (the claimant), on Monday afternoon, April 11, 2005, for making too many 
phone calls to Utah County." (Brief of Appellee at 5). Additionally, in argument on 
pages 20-21, the Board states "...Buck Taylor, testified that he had been disciplined by the 
claimant on Monday, April 11th, which was correct." (Brief of Appellee at 20). 
The testimony to the Board by Buck Taylor was that he had never been in trouble 
but had been "chewed out" for calling associates in Utah County. R. 118:37-40. Buck 
initially stated it was Monday the 11th but then realized it had occurred after reporting 
Claimant's conduct to Bill Howell, and must have occurred on the 12th. R. 119:1-15. 
Claimant, in her testimony, also characterizes the discipline as minor but states that it 
occurred in the afternoon of the 11th. R. 163. The Board, for its part, did not make a 
determination as to when the event actually occurred, presumably because it was 
characterized as being very minor by all involved. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
The narrow issue in this case is whether the Appeals Board's decision that 'strict 
discipline' of Claimant could have prevented future harm to SEUALG was unreasonable 
or irrational. First, Claimant's actions, and the possibility of her continued actions, 
jeopardized SEUALG's rightful interest by exposing SEUALG to the possiblity of future 
sex harassment lawsuits, regardless of whether those lawsuits could be proven. Second, 
Claimant's actions were serious enough that they violated a universal standard of conduct. 
Because her conduct was sufficiently serious, SEUALG was forced to discharge Claimant 
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to avoid future harm. Finally, because Claimant refused to admit the conduct, the 
effectiveness of a wstern form of discipline' would have been ineffective and SEUALG 
was left no other option but termination. The Appeals Board's decision in this case was 
unreasonable and irrational and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER BUCK OR KEVIN COULD PREVAIL IN A TITLE VII 
ACTION HAS LITTLE RELEVANCE TO THIS CASE. 
A. For Title VII to apply, the employer must fail to act—here, the 
employer acted immediately and appropriately. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). 
Without belaboring the cases, hostile work environment claims have arisen as a 
subset of Title VIL However, as correctly illustrated by the Appeals Board, referencing 
the Ford case, successful hostile work environment claims require that the conduct was so 
egregious that the employer should be held liable for failing to remedy or prevent the 
conduct. Ford v. West, 222 F. 3d 767 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Certainly, this case is nothing like Ford, an unsuccessful hostile work environment 
case. In Ford, the plaintiff was unable to substantiate either his factual claims or the 
employer's knowledge of events or failure to act. Id. In this case, SEUALG discovered 
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the egregious conduct and immediately acted, which would have foreclosed a claim under 
Title VII. 
More importantly, determining that an employer appropriately discharged an 
employee is an entirely different question from whether an employer failed to prevent 
sexual harassment in the workplace. One inquiry (the focus of this appeal) is focused on 
the employee who acted poorly. The other inquiry (for Title VII purposes) is focused on 
the employer's relationship with the victim. 
In this case, the inquiry is aimed at determining, whether Claimant's actions were 
so serious that continuing employment would *'...jeopardize the employer's rightful 
interest" and whether the conduct was so serious that Claimant had to be discharged to 
prevent future harm. R994-405-202, UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (2005). Title VII 
considerations are not relevant. 
B. The Ford case cited by the Appeals Board is entirely different from this 
case but illustrates the problem— the possibility of litigation at great 
expense which the employer has a rightful interest in avoiding. 
An employer has a rightful interest in preventing sexual harassment and protecting 
against sexual harassment lawsuits. Martin v. Department of Workforce Services, 2004 UT 
App. 264 (Unpublished); Autoliv ASP, Inc., v. Department of Workforce Services, 29 P.3d 7, 12 
(Utah CLApp. 2001). 
The benefit of the Ford case is to illustrate the potential problem in this case. The 
Ford case, though it was a racial harassment rather than a sex harassment case, made it to 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. That Court affirmed the trial court below and found the 
plaintiff s claims to be unfounded and unsupported. Ford v. West. The employee in 
that case failed to establish the facts to prove either that the harassment had occurred or 
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that the employer knew about it. Id at 777. Nevertheless, the employer was undoubtedly 
forced to expend considerable sums of money and time—likely tens of thousands of 
dollars worth—to defend against the plaintiffs allegations. 
In contrast to Ford, the Board's findings of fact in this case fully support 
SEUALG's position that inappropriate conduct had occurred—that Claimant grabbed 
Kevin's buttocks, fell over him, told him he was "hung like a horse," and offered him a 
"blow job." R. 212-213. Notably, the conduct was perpetrated by Claimant in her 
capacity as direct supervisor to Kevin. There was a very real possibility of a sexual 
harassment lawsuit in this case because sexual harassment of subordinates had actually 
occurred. 
Certainly, because the conduct was egregious enough to place SEUALG in a 
position of jeopardy with regard to the potential for substantiated lawsuits, SEUALG has 
a right to protect against that. Because Claimant refused to admit the conduct, the 'stern 
form of discipline' would have been ineffective and SEUALG was left no other option 
but termination. In this case, the Appeals Board's decision to allow benefits to Claimant 
was unreasonable and should be overturned. 
II. THE 'UNIVERSAL STANDARD' APPLIES TO BOTH KNOWLEDGE AND 
CULPABILITY BUT THE APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD IS 
DIFFERENT FOR CULPABILITY—IT IS A BALANCING TEST. 
The Appeals Board asserts that a "universal standard of conduct" consideration has 
no place in determining whether there was culpability in this case because the only cases 
addressing the issue apply to the knowledge prong of a just cause discharge. 
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Additionally, the Board asserts that Claimant's actions did not satisfy the culpability 
requirements of a just cause discharge. 
First, according to statute, the Claimant's conduct must be so serious that 
continued employment would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. This Court in 
Autoliv has already determined that sexually explicit material exposes an employer to 
sexual harassment claims. Autoliv at 12. And, the Martin court determined that an 
employer has a strong interest in preventing sexual harassment in the workplace. Martin 
at 265. Thus, an employer has a rightful interest in preventing sexual harassment claims. 
Moreover, in this case, the Appeals Board found that "it is universal knowledge that the 
behavior and comments of the claimant towards the subordinate would be contrary to the 
employer's expectations and rightful interests." R.214. The remaining question, 
therefore, is whether the Board's final decision, based on those findings, was 
unreasonable or irrational. 
Second, the statute requires a consideration of prior work history, pattern of bad 
conduct, and seriousness of the current conduct before detemiining that culpability is or is 
not present. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202. A violation of a universal standard of 
conduct certainly is an appropriate measuring rod when determining if Claimant was 
necessarily discharged to avoid future harm. According to statute, if there is only one 
instance of bad behavior, a pattern can't be established but, if seriousness enough, still 
may require discharge of the employee to avoid future harm. Id. In this case, the Board 
found that Claimant's behavior was clearly inappropriate in any professional 
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environment. R. 214. Furthermore, the substance of that behavior, as set forth in the 
statement of facts, was universally offensive. Since it was directed at a subordinate and 
occurred during a work trip, Claimant exposed the employer to the potential expense and 
difficulty of a lawsuit. By itself, the conduct was universally inappropriate and 
sufficiently serious to justify Claimant's discharge. 
Third, despite the Appeals Board's focus on pattern, a pattern of behavior is not 
required to justify a discharge—it is simply one factor to be considered. UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE R994-405-202. Additionally, in this case, there is evidence of prior sexually 
charged behavior by Claimant while traveling for work. During 2004, it was reported 
that claimant had used the term "blow job" though it was not directed at a subordinate. 
SEUALG didn't fail to investigate or take action. Instead, SEUALG determined that 
Claimant's actions on that occasion, while likely inappropriate, were not directed at 
subordinates and were probably outside the scope of the SEUALG's ability to discipline 
her. R. 222. Those events may also not conclusively establish a pattern but they are 
certainly relevant to the analysis. 
Finally, most informative in this case, is Claimant's failure to even acknowledge 
her behavior or to remedy the situation. She denied everything even before action was 
taken to terminate her employment. R. 213. That denial is the factor that so clearly 
justified SEUALG's determination to proceed with Claimant's termination and 
demonstrates the unreasonable conclusion of the Appeals Board. SEUALG could have 
considered lesser sanctions or discipline—if Claimant had "owned up" to her conduct. 
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By Claimant's denial, however, SEUALG was left with little alternative but to terminate 
her employment in order to protect itself. 
Because Claimant's conduct was so severe, was directed at her subordinates, and 
potentially exposed SEUALG to very costly lawsuits (whether supported or not), 
SEUALG had to take action to prevent future harm. Claimant's denial of the conduct 
prevented the consideration of lesser sanctions and the Appeals Board's conclusion that 
'stern discipline' was a viable alternative is unreasonable and irrational. This Court 
should reverse the decision on those grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
SEUALG respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Board's decision as unreasonable and irrational given the Appeal Board's findings of fact 
in the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this h day of June, 2006. 
BAILEY & TORGERSON, PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant, SEUALG 
By: ^ 
Don M. Torgerson 
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